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It is change, continuing change, inevitable change, that is the dominant
factor in society today. No sensible decision can be made any longer
without taking into account not only the world as it is, but the world as
it will be.'
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 12, 2000, the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of
Export Regulation ("BXA") issued new encryption export regulations that
removed most of the prior limitations on the export of U.S. encryption
technology. The previous export limitations, combined with efforts by the
Clinton Administration to encourage the use of key escrow, had sparked
contentious debate among public interest privacy groups, law enforcement,
and the high-tech software industry.2 The relaxation in policy signaled
another retreat by the Clinton Administration from strong restrictions on
export technology. While some questioned the complicated nature of the
regulations, one software executive characterized the liberalization as "an
'inside the ball park' home run."3 The finalized regulations had been
eagerly anticipated since September 16, 1999, when the White House
announced its proposal to loosen restrictions ("September proposal"),
perhaps because of increasing pressure from Congress through proposed
4legislation over the previous three years.
In the wake of the new regulations and the furor that led to them,
however, little mention has been made of the Cyberspace Electronic
Security Act of 1999 ("CESA"), which was announced by the Clinton
Administration in tandem with the September proposal to loosen export
restrictions.5 As proposed, CESA would "establish[] limitations on
government use and disclosure of decryption keys obtained by court
process and provide[] special protections for decryption keys stored with
third party 'recovery agents,"' and authorize appropriations for a Federal
Bureau of Investigations ("FBI") Technical Support Center to serve as a
1. Isaac Asimov, My Own View, in THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 129
(Robert Andrews ed., 1993).
2. See David E. Sanger & Jeri Clausing, U.S. Removes More Limits on Encryption
Technology, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2000, at Cl.
3. Id. Dan Burton is "vice president of governmental relations at Novell, Inc., a
leading software company which is based in Utah." Id.
4. John Schwartz, U.S. Eases Encryption Export Rules, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2000, at
El.
5. White House Press Release, Administration Announces New Approach to
Encryption (Sept. 16, 1999), at http://www.epic.org/crypto/legislationlcesa/WH_release_
9_16. html.
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resource for federal, state, and local law enforcement.6 Online privacy
proponents strongly criticized CESA, claiming it would allow the
government to circumvent the Fourth Amendment and easily gain access to
encrypted e-mails, business documents and private files.7 Former President
Clinton left office without Congress taking any action on CESA, despite
the White House's transmittal letter to Congress in September 1999.8
This Note argues that the marked changes in U.S. encryption policy in
the past seven years, specifically the relaxation of export regulations and
key escrow advocacy, result from governmental and societal recognition
and acceptance of how the world will be in the information age. Despite
these expansive actions, introduction of CESA signals yet another attempt
at government regulation of encryption technology. Therefore, this Note
encourages critical study of CESA and similar legislation to ensure public
awareness, understanding, and active involvement in shaping encryption
policies affecting those living and working in the interconnected twenty-
first century. Part II of this Note offers a brief history of cryptography and
explains modem terminology essential to comprehension of the encryption
debate. Part I traces governmental regulation of encryption technology-
until recently almost solely a creation of executive directive-and offers
competing arguments regarding key escrow systems and restrictive export
regulations. Part IV analyzes both facets of the September proposal: export
relaxation and CESA. Finally, Part V argues that Internet advances have
caused the dramatic policy shift of the past three years, and that the U.S.
government will continue to remove impediments to encryption
exportation. This section cautions, however, that legislation concerning
encryption, like CESA, should be monitored continuously to ensure that
privacy concerns are adequately addressed.
6. CESA Transmittal Letter to Congress (Sept. 16, 1999), at http://www.epic.org/
crypto/legislation/cesa/transmittal.htrni [hereinafter CESA Transmittal Letter to Congress].
7. Online Privacy Expert Rips New Clinton Internet Security Policy, Bus. WIMe, Oct.
19, 1999, available at LEXIS. A prior version of CESA, previously obtained from a
Department of Justice internal memorandum, was even more vehemently opposed. James P.
Lucier, Enemies of the State, INsiGnT ON THE NEWS, Sept. 13, 1999, available at LEXIS.
This version contained a provision that would allow government access to encryption keys,
even when such keys were not stored with a third party. Id. Counsel from the Electronic
Privacy Information Center ("EPIC") decried this version of CESA as "one of the scariest
proposals to come out of government in a long time. This strikes at the heart of the Bill of
Rights." Id.
8. CESA Transmittal Letter to Congress, supra note 6. The prospect of the bill ever
being introduced to Congress in its current form seems highly unlikely. See discussion infra
Part IV.B.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY AND EXPLANATION OF ENCRYPTION
A. What is Encryption?
Stanford Law Professor Lawrence Lessig writes with only slight
exaggeration that encryption technologies are the most important
technological innovations of the last millennium.9  Encryption, or
cryptography, may be understood on a basic level as scrambling
information to disguise an intended communication.' The disguise may
serve several purposes, including protecting the privacy, security,
authenticity, and integrity of the communication." Encryption allows a
readable message-plantext-to be transformed into an unreadable
message-ciphertext-which remains incomprehensible to the recipient
without a "key" to unlock the transformed message and return it to its
original form.12 An analogy to house keys illustrates how encryption keys
function.' 3 A homeowner or intended guests may enter a home through use
9. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 35 (1999) (stating that
"[ciryptography will change everything" in social and political life).
10. The explanation of encryption offered in this Note merely aims to provide
rudimentary concepts to appreciate the debate about encryption policy. The reader is
forewarned that modem encryption technology is complex and involves highly technical
subtleties. For a more technical explanation of encryption theory, see David B. Walker,
Privacy in the Digital Age: Encryption Policy-A Calfor Congressional Action, 1999 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 3, 13-20 (1999). For an explanation from the perspective of a well-known
corporation that specializes in encryption products, see RSA Laboratories' Frequently Asked
Questions About Today's Cryptography, Version 4.1, at http://www.rsasecurity.com/
rsalabs/faq/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2001). The site offers a full index of questions and answers
in a fairly objective manner and is a valuable resource in sorting through confusing topics.
See id
11. WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF
WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 12(1998).
12. Id. at 13-14.
13. Id.
The analogy with locks and keys is particularly apt in another respect. The lock
and key are distinct components of a system that controls the use of doors,
cabinets, cars, and other things. The lock is a moderately complex mechanical
device with numerous moving parts-about two dozen in the case of a normal
door lock. The key is a single piece of metal. There are, on the other hand, far
fewer types of locks than cuts of keys. Most doors use one of a dozen popular
brands of locks, each of which can be keyed to accept one of a million different
possible keys. A lock is typically far more expensive than its key, and more
expensive to replace, particularly with a lock of a different kind. Perhaps the most
important distinction between locks and keys is that locks are not, in principle,
secret. Locks are easily recognizable even if they do not display their brand
names, and there is no reason to be concerned that people know what type of lock
you use on your front door. The cut of the key, on the other hand, is a secret, and
any locksmith or burglar who knows it can make a duplicate that will open the
door.
In exactly the same way, cryptographic systems are divided into the so-called
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of a house key that fits the lock on the front door and allows the keyholder
to gain access, while keeping non-keyholders outside. Similarly, encryption
keys allow intended readers to "unlock," and thereby understand, messages
while keeping uninvited readers locked safely outside the circle of
understanding.
While this Note focuses on the modem implications of encryption, the
field's significant past should not be overlooked. 14 Initially, cryptography
was accomplished simply through the manual substitution of one item for
another to provide security in communications or information
transmissions.' 5 Early military communications employed this method and
still comprise one of the most prevalent uses of encryption, because
different factions often needed to transmit messages to one another and
ensure integrity." With the advent of radio signals in World War I, the
military required a stronger method of encryption, because messages were
increasingly vulnerable to interception.17 Cryptographers thus began to
work on mechanizing encryption, a path that led to the automatic
encryption systems used today.'8
B. Modem Encryption
Just as World War I and radio signals led to a rethinking of
encryption systems, the expansion of the Internet created similar demands
for even more secure encryption technology.' 9 Exponential advancements
general system (or just system) and the specific key (or key). It has been a principle
of cryptography for more than a century that the general system should not be
regarded as secret. The keys, in contrast, must be kept secret, because anyone who
is in possession of them will be able to read encrypted messages, just as anyone
who is in possession of a door key can open the door.
Id. at 13 (citation omitted).
14. See id. at 12.
15. Id.
16. Indeed, a famous use of cryptography in this context allowed the United States to
garner a decisive victory against the Japanese at the Battle of Midway, when naval
intelligence was able to ascertain the destination of the Imperial Japanese Fleet by breaking
Japan's Purple Code. Joel C. Mandelman, Lest We Walk Into the Well: Guarding the Keys-
Encrypting the Constitution: To Speak, Search & Seize in Cyberspace, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 227, 230 (1998). "Encryption, and the breaking of codes and ciphers, has been of
overwhelming importance in the diplomatic and military history of the United States since
the Civil War. By intercepting enemy messages, battlefield commanders learned where
troops were heading and in what numbers." Id.
17. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 11, at 49-50.
18. Id. at 50.
19. The growth of the Internet has astounded many. In November 1998, it was
estimated that 140 million people around the world were connected to the Internet. U.S.
GOVERNMENT WORKING GROUP ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, TOWARDs DIGITAL EQUALITY,
2ND ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1999), available at http://www.ecommerce.gov/ecomrce.pdf (last
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in access, speed, and power have created a global interdependence unseen
and-some might argue-unimagined until the past decade. Encryption's
smooth and often imperceptible integration into daily life has become
essential to modem day society. 20 Encryption is used to protect individual
and business finance, as well as the national infrastructure that runs powerS • 21
grids, hospitals, and communications. More notably, the explosion of e-
commerce makes it difficult to recall not being able to buy a plane ticket
online or trade stocks from one's personal computer, and many take
22advantage of these new conveniences.
These advances come at a price, however, which must be contained
through adequate security measures to protect the large, growing quantities
of sensitive and private information that now move along digital channels.
Recently, the fragility of Web site security became painfully clear when a
hacker published thousands of credit card numbers obtained from
23customers of CD Universe after the company refused a ransom demand.
Public awareness of the vulnerability of online information has helped
create a large market for strong encryption technology. 24 This new-age
encryption technology, while based on the same simple substitution
foundation of earlier cryptography, is now increasingly, and necessarily,
complex.
The modem process by which a message is encrypted and decrypted
involves complicated mathematical algorithms. 2' The strength of an
visited Jan. 19, 2001) [hereinafter TowADs DIGITAL EQUALITY]. This number jumped 40%
to more than 200 million by September 1999, and is expected to continue to climb. Id
20. Using a PIN number at an ATM is an example of encryption used by many on a
daily basis. See RSA Laboratories' Frequently Asked Questions About Today's
Cryptography, Version 4.1, How is Cryptography applied?, at http://www.rsasecurity.com/
rsalabs/faq/1-4.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2001).
21. Kenneth P. Weinberg, Cryptography: "Key Recovery" Shaping Cyberspace
(Pragmatism and Theory), 5 J. INTELL. PRoP. L. 667, 680 (1998).
22. Estimates in early 1998 predicted that Intemet retailing would reach as high as $7
billion by the year 2000. TOWARDS DIGITAL EQUALITY, supra note 19, at 6. E-commerce
continues to grow worldwide, and the possibilities seem endless. See id.
23. Margaret Mannix, High-tech Card Fraud Goes on Right Behind Your Back, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 14, 2000, at 54, 55. Gregory Regan, a U.S. Secret Service agent
involved in the financial crimes division, notes, "Credit card fraud is the bank robbery of the
future," a problem only exacerbated by the Internet. Id. at 54.
24. See DImE & LANDAU, supra note 11, at 6 (noting a researcher's estimate that the
market for commercial cryptography, even though relatively new, has already surpassed that
of the military).
25. The Center for Democracy and Technology ("CDT'), a non-profit public policy
organization that works to promote civil liberties in the digital age, offers a fairly
comprehensive glossary of cryptographic terms on its Web site. See Ctr. for Democracy and
Tech., Glossary of Cryptographic Terms, at http://www.cdt.org/crypto/glossary.shtml (last
visited Jan. 3, 2001); Mai-Trm B. Dinh, The U.S. Encryption Export Policy: Taking the
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encryption key is determined by how difficult it would be for a third party
to break the code, which depends on the key length, measured in bits, and
the complexity of the algorithm in question.26 Bits are the digits "0" and
"1" used for encoding computer data; the greater the number of bits, the
greater security afforded in an encryption algorithm, because more
combinations are possible, thereby making the code harder to break.27 For
example, a 40-bit key length offers more than a trillion possible
combinations, a 56-bit key length permits more than 72 quadrillion
combinations, and a 128-bit key length allows 3.4 x 104 possible
28
combinations of key sequences.
The most common, and widely used, algorithm is the Digital
Encryption Standard ("DES"), which has a key length of 56 bits and was
developed by the federal government in the 1970s.2 1 The 56-bit key length
was once considered secure, but recent DES "cracking contests," sponsored
by a prominent producer of encryption technology, have proven
otherwise." The weakness of a 56-bit key length also becomes apparent
when one recognizes that by June 1999, the minimum strength to meet the
standards of new Internet applications was 128-bit encryption.3 1 Since
recognizing the problem in 1997, the National Institute of Science and
Technology ("NIST"), a division of the Department of Commerce, has
been working to create a more powerful algorithm, known as the Advanced
Encryption Standard ("AES").32 In October 2000, NIST announced the
selection of an algorithm named "Rijndael" as the proposed AES .
Byte Out of the Debate, 7 MANN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 375, 379 (1998).
26. Dinh, supra note 25, at 379.
27. Kurt M. Saunders, The Regulation of Internet Encryption Technologies: Separating
the Wheat From the Chaff, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUT R & IhFo. L. 945, 947 n.16 (1999).
28. Dinh, supra note 25, at 379-80.
29. Walker, supra note 10, at 16.
30. Id. RSA Data Security sponsored the contests, the most recent of which occurred in
January 1999, where the algorithm was cracked in merely 23 hours. Id. By November 1998,
because of concerns that DES was not secure, the U.S. government no longer approved its
use in original form. Id. at 16 n.60.
31. Immediate Need for Relaxation of Export Controls for Software and Hardware with
Encryption Capabilities: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp.,
106th Cong. 7 (1999) (statement of D. James Bidzos, Vice Chair, Security Dynamic
Technologies, Inc., Parent Company of RSA Data Security, Inc., on behalf of Americans for
Computer Privacy) [hereinafter Statement of D. James Bidzos].
32. Nat'l Inst. of Sci. and Tech., Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Development
Effort, at http:llcsrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes (last visited Jan. 19, 2001).
33. See Commerce Department Announces Winner of Global Information Security
Competition, at http://www.nist.gov/public affairslreleases/gOO-176.htm (last visited Jan.
27, 2001). The AES was determined through a series of contests, in which submissions were
taken from members of the global cryptographic community. A group of fifteen candidates
was announced on August 20, 1998, and the final algorithm was chosen in October 2000.
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Assuming the rest of the development schedule proceeds as expected, AES
should be completed by summer 2001. 3 4 In the interim, triple-DES, which
requires the use of three DES keys, has become the de facto standard used
by the U.S. government and other entities.
Two basic types of widely available encryption systems are private36("symmetric") key systems and public ("asymmetric") key systems. In a
private key system, the same key is used to both encrypt and decrypt the
message. Therefore, the system remains vulnerable because the key used to
decrypt the information must be sent to the intended recipient of the
message, leading to the risk that the key could be intercepted.37 The key
itself might also be more vulnerable to attack because it is used twice. A
public key system employs two keys-a public and a private key-that are
mathematically related.38 The public key is published, thus eliminating the
need to send a key through another form of communication that could be
intercepted.39 Anyone can encrypt a message using the public key, but only
the intended recipient, with sole possession of the private key, can decrypt
the message. For example, if Karen wants to send a confidential
communication to Andy, she can look up Andy's public key, encrypt the
message using the key, and then send the encrypted message to Andy. Only
Andy will be able to read the message, because he holds the private key
capable of decrypting the scrambled message.40
As illustrated by the preceding paragraphs, encryption is a highly
technical field previously only of interest to a select few in the military or
technological industry. Unfortunately, the complex scientific language
surrounding this technology sterilizes the subject area and causes
encryption to seem a relatively benign topic. Such an assessment is
Rijndael was chosen "because it had the best combination of security, performance,
efficiency, implementability and flexibility." Id.
34. Id.
35. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 11, at 28.
36. Saunders, supra note 27, at 948.
37. Id. The protection of the integrity and security of keys is known as "key
management." Id.
38. Id.
39. Walker, supra note 10, at 17. It should be noted, though, that because the private
and public keys are mathematically related, the discovery of the public key can easily lead
to the attack and discovery of the private key. Id Therefore, robust encryption is essential.
See id
40. Saunders, supra note 27, at 948. Public key encryption may also be used as a digital
signature that allows a person or a business to ensure the integrity of an electronic
document. Id. For more information on digital signatures and their future importance for e-
commerce and other applications, see Raneta Lawson Mack, Comment, Digital Signatures,
the Electronic Economy and the Protection of National Security: Some Distinctions with an
Economic Difference, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 981 (1999).
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dangerously naYve. With the movement of personal records and private
information from wallets and locked drawers into the borderless world of
cyberspace, individuals must be able to rely on new methods of security to
protect their interests. Furthermore, business organizations and consumers
alike must become and remain confident in the integrity of digital
transactions to ensure continued growth in the area. Not surprisingly,
because of the importance of encryption, the federal government, until
recently, has taken a very heavy-handed approach to regulating encryption
technology, which has significantly impacted the encryption debate.
III. GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN THE REGULATION OF
ENCRYPTION
A. Balancing Competing Interests
As online security has become increasingly important throughout the
past decade, two concerns regarding encryption regulation have divided the
U.S. government: (1) the ability of American high-tech industries to
compete in foreign markets; and (2) the ability of criminals and terrorists to
threaten national security through the use of strong encryption devices.
Through a complicated combination of regulations, such as key-length
export limits and license exemptions for software and equipment over those
key lengths only after governmental review, the government has placed its
domestic high-tech industry at a severe disadvantage.42 Initially, other
countries waited for the United States, the leader in strong consumer
cryptography, to take action. Domestic stagnation coupled with lax
restrictions by foreign governments, however, have caused U.S. industry to
lag behind its competition. 43 Arguably, government regulation has
impinged upon the economic growth of an industry that in 1996 had sales
upwards of $1.8 billion.44 Some critics contend that, because of U.S.
restrictions, the industry has already lost more than $65 million.45
The government's justification for tight regulation stems from
national security concerns. In the past, electronic surveillance, such as
court-ordered wiretaps, has proven successful in the detection, prevention,
41. See Walker, supra note 10, at 22-31; DIFFm& LANDAU, supra note 11, at 77-108.
42. Christina A. Cockburn, Comment, Where the United States Goes the Rest of the
World Will Follow-Won't It?, 21 Hous. J. INT'LL. 491, 502-04 (1999).
43. See id But see Dinh, supra note 25, at 390 ("Australia, Israel, Canada, China, and
New Zealand boast growing encryptions industries. However, these governments generally
enforce far more restrictive export controls than the United States. . . .Thus, the
international encryption market is not as open as many argue.").
44. Cockburn, supra note 42, at 498.
45. Weinberg, supra note 21, at 687.
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and prosecution of crimes.46 Based on this success, the government has
attempted to limit the overall strength of encryption software so that, when
an encrypted message is intercepted, the government will have the ability
to decrypt it.47  Law enforcement officials feared that continued
development of strong encryption would cause them greater difficulties in
remaining abreast of technological advances in a time frame conducive to
48preventing harm. While these concerns are well founded, some
compromise must be reached that effectively balances the ability of the
government to protect its citizens against the high-tech industry's ability to
create and market strong encryption products.
B. Governmental Regulation in the Form of Export Restrictions
No restrictions exist on the use, creation, or sale of encryption
products within the United States. Exportation of encryption technology,
however, has been heavily restricted.49 Until 1996, many encryption
technologies were classified as "munitions," based on the predominant
military use of cryptography, and their export was forbidden under the
Export Administration Regulations ("EAR"),50  which along with the
International Traffic in Arms Regulation ("ITAR"), 5' administers the Arms
46. Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and IntelL Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 49
(1999) (statement of Ronald D. Lee, Assoc. Dep. Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice).
47. Promote Reliable On-Line Transactions to Encourage Commerce and Trade
(PROTECT) Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 106th
Cong. (1999) (statement of the Honorable James Robinson, Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal
Division, Dep't of Justice), available at http:/www.senate.gov/-commerce/hearings
0610rob.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2001).
48. Id. Mr. Robinson also offered anecdotal evidence evincing the need for strong, but
recoverable, encryption:
I want to emphasize that this concern is not theoretical, nor is it exaggerated.
Although the use of encryption is far from universal, we have already begun to
encounter its harmful effects. For example, in an investigation of a multinational
child pornography ring, investigators discovered sophisticated encryption used to
conceal thousands of images of child pornography that were exchanged among
members. Similarly, in several major computer hacker cases, the subjects have
encrypted computer files, thereby concealing evidence of serious crimes....
Finally criminal use of encryption is increasingly international--the United
Kingdom recently reported that in 1996 it seized encrypted files from a Northern
Irish terrorist group concerning terrorist targets such as police officers and
politicians. In that case, law enforcement was able to read the data, but only after
considerable effort.
Id.
49. Saunders, supra note 27, at 949.
50. 15 C.F.R. pts. 730-99 (2000).
51. 22 C.F.R. pts. 120-30 (2000).
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Export Control Act ("AECA") 52 through the State Department.53 Encryption
technology is also considered a dual-use technology, because it is used by
both military and civilians. 4 In fact, the growing civilian use of encryption
might arguably be more important than its military use.5"
On November 15, 1996, former President Clinton signed an
Executive Order that transferred regulation of all encryption technologies,
except those developed solely for military use, to the Commerce
Department. 56 The action arguably benefited hopeful exporters of
encryption technology who anticipated that the Commerce Department's
staff would expedite license grants.5 7 Under State Department regulation, it
could take a significant amount of time for a company to obtain an export
license.58 The 1996 transfer order was followed by an announcement in
September 1998 that the government would allow the export of increased
bit-length products and relief for certain industry groups, including U.S.
subsidiaries and insurance companies.5 9 Reform efforts reached their apex
with the January 12, 2000 announcement allowing export of strong
60
encryption technology with few exceptions. The government's laissez-
faire attitude continued in July 2000, when President Clinton's Chief of
Staff, John Podesta, announced that U.S. companies could export any
encryption products without a license to any end-user in the fifteen nations
of the European Union, as well as Australia, Norway, the Czech Republic,
61Hungary, Poland, Japan, New Zealand, and Switzerland. This
52. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
53. Saunders, supra note 27, at 950.
54. Id.
55. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
56. Exec. Order No. 13,026, 3 C.F.R. 228 (1996).
57. Stewart A. Baker & Peter Lichtenbaum, Cutting Red Tape on Encryption, J. COM.,
Sept. 27, 1996, at 9A.
58. See Walker, supra note 10, at 25-26.
59. CDT, An Overview of Clinton Administration Encryption Policy Initiatives, at
http:lwww.cdt.org/crypto/admin/initiatives.shtml (last visited Jan. 19, 2001) [hereinafter
Overview of Encryption Policy]. Because businesses feared that corporate secrets would be
vulnerable to attack, the Clinton Administration allowed the use of unlimited encryption for
certain U.S. subsidiaries, companies in the health and medical fields, online merchants, and
insurance companies. Cockburn, supra note 42, at 508.
60. For example, the bit length of encryption keys has been allowed to increase over
time. Similarly, while the Clinton Administration once strongly advocated mandatory key
escrow, it was forced to back away from this stance, possibly because of the negative
reaction to Clipper Chip. See infra Part fiL.B.1.
61. Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, Administration Updates
Encryption Export Policy (July 17, 2000), available at http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/.
The White House added: "The steps announced today continue our policy to serve the full
range of national interests: promote electronic commerce, support law enforcement and
national security, protect privacy, and maintain U.S. industry leadership in security
Number 2]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
announcement eliminated technical review and the resulting delay in
overseas sales.62
1. Domestic Executive Initiatives
Prior to the January 12, 2000 liberalization of encryption export
policies, the Clinton Administration had initiated a number of domestic
policies regarding encryption. Clinton was the first president forced to face
the strong and undeniable influence of the Internet on the global stage. As
such, the past eight years have been an experimental time for encryption
and Internet policy alike, and President George W. Bush will face the
challenge of implementing policy that found its genesis during the prior
administration.
During his presidency, Clinton made enemies of privacy groups and
members of the high-tech industry with initiatives such as the 1993
proposal of the ill-fated "Clipper Chip," 64 a physical chip that would have
allowed the government to access encrypted information. 6' The algorithm
used for the Clipper Chip ("Clipper") was developed by the National
Security Agency ("NSA") and known as "Skipjack." Because the NSA
classified the Skipjack algorithm, it was not possible to make judgments
66
about its strength. Detractors complained that electronic security was too
important to allow the government to classify algorithms without public
scrutiny.6' Three more Clipper proposals followed, the last being Clipper
3.1.1, which, as proposed, continued restrictions on exported encryption
technology to enforce mandatory key escrow.68
technologies." Id.
62. Id.
63. Though currently it is unclear exactly how the Bush Administration will tackle
issues like encryption technology, an article by then-candidate Bush offers some insight:
Our current technology export system is broken. Our best companies cannot sell
some products abroad-even when foreign competitors sell equivalent
technology. I will safeguard military technology and let Americans sell what is
already widely available. I will lead efforts to free the sale and export of American
computers, as well as other high-tech goods, including encryption software.
George W. Bush, Technology and prosperity: Let dreams flourish, COMPUTERWORLD, Aug.
9, 1999, at 30, available at LEXIS, News Group File, Most Recent Two Years.
64. EPIC, The Clipper Chip, at http:llwww.epic.org/crypto/clipper/ (last visited Jan. 3,
2001) [hereinafter The Clipper Chip].
65. Id.
66. Id
67. George Leopold, Report: Dump Clipper, Open Encryption Debate, ELEC. ENG'G
TIMEs, July 4, 1994, at 4. "The Clinton Administration should drop its Clipper key-escrow
proposal and launch a public review of U.S. encryption policy to better balance privacy
concerns with law enforcement and national security issues, a report by a panel of
encryption experts, including Clipper supporters, concludes." Id.
68. Overview of Encryption Policy, supra note 59. This site also offers information on
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Arguably, the promotion of mandatory key escrow was the most
significant aspect of the Clipper Chip proposals.' 9 Key escrow is a process
that requires a copy of decryption keys, similar to a spare set of house keys,
to be placed into escrow with a third party, known as a Trusted Third Party
(,,P,). 70 Another example of a TIP is a Certificate Authority ("CA"), a
public or private body that can issue digital certificates of authenticity in e-
commerce situations where one party wants to verify the ownership of an
individual's public key.1 Stored keys may be accessed if the original
keyholder loses or forgets the information.7 2 Without a third-party recovery
system, the message could remain encrypted indefinitely, causing great
delay and inconvenience.73 Despite the innocuous uses of key escrow, also
known as back-door software,74 the process often has been insidiously
associated with the ability of government to decode messages under the
guise of law enforcement and national security.
75
The 1993 introduction of Clipper, and the three similar proposals that
followed, illustrates but one route attempted by the Clinton Administration
to advocate development and use of key escrow. In what could be
interpreted as an attempt to force the high-tech industry to submit to
governmental desires, the Clinton Administration offered to allow export of
encryption software to other countries, provided that a spare set of keys
was turned over to a government-approved TTP, which could then release
the keys during an investigation.76 The high-tech industry and others argued
forcefully that such action notably reduced the viability of the software for
export. Foreign consumers, aware of the U.S. government access,
understandably balked at the potential of exposing private or business
Clipper II, proposed in 1995, and Clipper 1r1, proposed in the summer of 1996. Id.
69. See The Clipper Chip, supra note 64.
70. Dinh, supra note 25, at 379-81. Examples of TrPs, also called key recovery agents,
are commercial or governmental entities which meet some level of trustworthiness. Id. at
380 n.41. See also Walker, supra note 10, at 20.
71. Walker, supra note 10, at 20.
72. RSA Laboratories' Frequently Asked Questions About Today's Cryptography,
Version 4.1, What is Key Recovery?, at http:llwww.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/faqT-12.html
(last visited Jan. 3, 2001).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. DInFR & LANDAU, supra note 11, at 7.
The effect is very much like that of the little keyhole in the back of the
combination locks used on lockers of schoolchildren. The children open the locks
with the combinations, which are supposed to keep other children out, but the
teachers can always open the lockers by using the key.
Id.
76. EPIC, Key Escrow, at http://www.epic.org/crypto/ key-.escrow/ (last visited Jan. 19,
2001) [hereinafter Key Escrow].
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documents to the U.S. government.77 Therefore, the software industry
adamantly opposed this regulation and restriction on trade.78
2. International Executive Initiatives
Facing domestic resistance to mandatory key escrow, the Clinton
Administration attempted to pressure other countries to support restrictions
on the export of encryption software over a certain key length.79 Despite
lobbying efforts by the White House, on March 27, 1997, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") adopted
cryptography guidelines that did not advocate a strong position in favor of
key escrow.80 Also frustrating was the October 8, 1997 European Union
("EU") publication of a draft paper adopting market forces and self-
regulation of industry as its official stance toward encryption-a view the
Clinton Administration strongly opposed.8' Finally, the Administration's
mandatory key escrow policy suffered a lethal hit when the Wassenaar
Arrangement group, an agreement between thirty-three industrialized
countries to restrict exportation of dual-use technologies to certain
countries, rejected key escrow in 1998.82
It is now apparent that the strength of encryption products available
worldwide cannot be controlled unilaterally by the United States. Indeed, it
makes little sense to restrict domestic companies from exporting encryption
77. Mack, supra note 40, at 995. "Opponents argue that backdoor access will be a
strong disincentive for non-U.S. companies to purchase the software and will only increase
the foreign competitive advantage by providing more business for software companies
outside the U.S. that do not impose such a requirement." Id.
78. Rutrell Yasin, Senators Pledge to Push Encryption Reform, INRmTMRETWK, June
22, 1998, available at LEXIS. Leading computer executives, including then-Microsoft CEO
Bill Gates, met with former Attorney General Janet Reno and FBI Director Louis Freeh to
work out an amicable solution in June 1998, but neither side would agree to change its
position. Id.
79. EPIC, Cryptography and Liberty 2000: An International Survey of Encryption
Policy, at http://www2.epic.org/reports/crypto2000/overview.html#Heading9 (last visited
Jan. 19, 2001) [hereinafter Cryptography and Liberty]. See also Cockburn, supra note 42, at
520-25.
80. Cockburn, supra note 42, at 521. Despite this apparent victory for key escrow
opponents, the Clinton Administration's push to the organization about the benefits of key
escrow did make some countries more sympathetic than they had previously been to the
U.S. argument. Id.
81. Mack, supra note 40, at 995.
82. Cryptography and Liberty, supra note 79. Some might argue that the worst blow,
though, was dealt by a November 1996 memorandum from William A. Reinsch, the
Commerce Department's Under Secretary for Export Administration, which admitted to the
inferiority of Clinton's favored key escrow technology. Mem. from William A. Reinsch,
The Under Secretary for Export Administration, U.S. Dep't of Comm., to Deputies
Subgroup on Cryptography (Nov. 25, 1996), available at http://www.epic.orglcrypto/
keyescrow/reinsch_memo.html.
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technology over a certain bit length when such technology is readily
available in other markets. With the ability to download information from
the Internet, a criminal or terrorist could easily obtain robust encryption
technology from foreign software companies online and violate no law. In
such a scenario, the government cannot decrypt criminal communications,
and limiting the strength of the encryption products that U.S. companies
can export does not address the problem. An artificially imposed limit on
the strength of exported encryption technology only serves to make the
American software industry, which accounts for seventy percent of the
world market, less competitive where it once had a decisive edge.83 In
addition, the recent growth in the software industry has produced many
new jobs in the United States, as well as billions of dollars in tax revenue.84
To stifle such progress through regulations on encryption technology is
unnecessary and ineffective.
C. Legislative Response
In the face of executive initiatives, Congress grew increasingly vocal
regarding the proper response of the legislature to encryption technology.
Since 1997, a variety of legislation has been promulgated." Arguably, the
Security and Freedom Through Encryption ("SAFE") Act, introduced by
Representative Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.) and Representative Zod Lofgren (D-
Cal.), gathered the most momentum.86 SAFE's intent was to protect
domestic use of encryption, as well as to ease export controls
dramatically. 7 SAFE prohibited mandatory key recovery, allowed the
export of available software and hardware if a product of similar strength
was already on the market, and created criminal penalties for using
encryption to conceal a crime.8 8 The bill garnered a great deal of bipartisan
83. Statement of D. James Bidzos, supra note 31, at 5.
84. Id.
85. Other proposed pieces of legislation which are beyond the scope of this Note but
trace congressional interest in the encryption arena, include Promote Reliable On-Line
Transactions to Encourage Commerce and Trade ("PROTECT") Act of 1999, sponsored by
Sen. John McCain (R-AZ). S. 798, 106th Cong. (1999). The bill aimed to promote e-
commerce through encouraging the use of encryption in interstate commerce, consistent
with national security objectives. Id. See also Encryption for the National Interest Act, H.R.
2616, 106th Cong. (1999); Secure Public Networks Act, S. 909, 105th Cong. (1997);
Promotion of Commerce On-Line in the Digital Age, S. 377, 105th Cong. (1997); Encrypted
Communications Privacy Act of 1997, S. 376, 105th Cong. (1997).
86. H.R. 850, 106th Cong. (1999).
87. CDT, SAFE H.R. 850, at http://www.cdt.org/ crypto/legis_106/SAFE/ (last visited
Jan. 3, 2001).
88. Id.
Number2
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
support and more than 250 co-sponsors. 8' After the bill's circulation
through a variety of committees, its proponents were optimistic that the
legislation could be passed in 2000 because of its support in Congress, as
well as from industry, privacy advocates, and consumer groups.90 At a
hearing before the House Judiciary Committee, several industry members
testified in support of the bill and the immediate need for relaxation of
encryption policy.91 SAFE explicitly rejected the Clinton Administration's
desire for mandatory key escrow, and would have allowed U.S. industry
92the ability to contend with foreign competitors. In advancing legislation
like SAFE, Congress pushed the Clinton Administration to accept the
emergence of a global interconnection that the U.S. cannot exclusively
control.
With the new regulations announced on January 12, 2000, however,
the driving force behind SAFE diminished, and the issue now appears to be
moot.93 Representative Lofgren said of the change in policy: "It's not
perfect, but it's not bad.... Much of what we hoped to achieve through
SAFE has been achieved through these regulations. 94 She also said it
would be a mistake to continue to push the bill because much had been
achieved through the new regulations.95 Representative Goodlatte was more
guarded in his comments, stating that lawmakers would carefully watch
future actions by the Administration, and take up SAFE again if "the
regulations do not allow American companies to fully compete in the
89. Id.
90. Cockbum, supra note 42, at 515.
91. Security and Freedom Through Encryption (Safe) Act: Hearing on H.R. 850 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts and Intell. Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. 137 (1999) (testimony of Dave McCurdy, President of the Electronic Industries
Alliance) Electronic Industries Alliance is an alliance of trade associations with more than
2000 member companies. IL See also id. at 74 (testimony of Thomas Parenty, Director of
Data and Communications Security for Sybase, Inc.). Parenty is responsible for security-
related product development at one of the top ten largest software companies in the world.
Id. Parenty has also worked at the NSA, and was testifying on behalf of the Business
Software Alliance ("BSA"). Id. He made three main points in his testimony before the
Subcommittee:
Widespread deployment of encryption is not only desirable, it is critical;
America's export policy should promote widespread deployment of products with
encryption capabilities in the worldwide market; and BSA strongly supports the
SAFE Act because it provides freedom for Americans to use and sell any
encryption domestically and provides greatly needed export control relief.
Id. at 75.
92. Id.
93. Reducing US Crypto Export Rules, WIRED NEWS (Jan. 13, 2000), at http:ll
www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,33625,00.html.
94. Schwartz, supra note 4.
95. Id.
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global marketplace. '96 For the moment, legislative action has stalled and
will await further catalysis by the Bush Administration.
IV. WHITE HOUSE ENCRYPTION POLICY ANNOUNCEMENT OF
1999: NEW EXPORT REGULATIONS AND CESA
The September proposal contained both encryption regulation and
proposed legislation, but the proposed export regulations garnered the
majority of media and political attention.97 The two-part announcement
included (1) the relaxation of export regulations, and (2) CESA. By
including CESA in the announcement, the government made clear that it
had not abandoned its advocacy of recoverable (key escrow) encryption
technology. CESA would ensure law enforcement access to decryption
keys stored with third parties. This Note will now discuss each part of the
September proposal in turn.
A. The New Export Regulations
Per its promise in the September proposal, the BXA released a draft
of the new encryption export regulations in November 1999."8 Despite the
regulations' lessened controls on retail encryption, high-tech
representatives and privacy groups protested that the results fell short of
promises made in September.99 Complaints arose regarding the complexity
of the regulations, but industry representatives did praise the
Administration's decision to give source code the same treatment as other
commercial products.'0 William A. Reinsch, the Under Secretary of
Commerce who headed the BXA, stated that the regulations were a "work
in progress" and were offered to the public in order to solicit input and
"take their criticisms to heart."''
96. Reducing US Crypto Export Rules, supra note 93.
97. See Jerry Seper, Clinton Seeks to Step up Computer Code Exports, WASH. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 1999, at A4.
98. See Jeri Clausing, Administration Releases Draft of Encryption Export Rules (Nov.
23, 1999), at http:l/www.nytime.comllibrary/tech/99/1 1/cyber/articles/24code.html.
99. Id. Stewart Baker, partner at the law f'-m of Steptoe & Johnson in Washington,
D.C., felt that the regulations were much better than the scheme under which the U.S. had
operated, and felt that any complaining was inappropriate. "[There's a part of me that wants
to say, 'You've been upgraded from a prop plane to a Concorde and now you're going to
complain that you didn't get a window seat?"' Id.
100. Id. Source code is a written version of software that allows anyone trained in the
computer language to interpret and understand how the program is constructed. Id.
101. Id. Reinsch also cynically noted:
We assumed nobody was going to be happy because they never are-My
objective was to put forth a good faith effort that reflects what was said in
September, a good faith effort to keep it simple. But we felt at this point in the
process the smartest thing to do was to get the paper out and get comment so we
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The finalized regulations released in January 2000 answered some of
the concerns voiced in November, but still drew fire based on their highly
complicated nature. 02 The new regulations substantially loosened
restrictions, and virtually all encryption programs on the retail market can
now be sold overseas after a "one-time" government review.' ° American
companies also now have the ability to export encryption products of any
key length to commercial firms and individual consumers without the
license that was previously required. 4 Further, U.S. companies may export
any encryption item to foreign subsidiaries through streamlined
requirements, and foreign employees no longer need export licenses to
work on encryption.' 5 The longstanding prohibition on exporting
encryption software to states supporting terrorism-Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
North Korea, Sudan, and Syria-still remains in effect. 106 Former
Commerce Secretary William M. Daley stated that "[t]his policy helps
business and promotes e-commerce by adjusting our regulations to
marketplace realities that U.S companies face when they try to sell their
products overseas.' 0 7
The January 2000 regulations represented a good-faith effort by the
BXA and the Clinton Administration to answer industry and individual
concerns, but problems remained. First, the one-time technical review of
encryption products prior to export still allowed the government access to
the encryption process prior to sale, which made the products unattractive
to foreign consumers as well as privacy proponents" Second, the highly
technical nature of the restrictions forced anyone desiring to export
encryption technology to seek the advice of an attorney skilled in the area-
an expensive proposition.'09 While retaining advice of experienced counsel
may not be a difficult task for a large corporation with adequate financial
could go back to the drawing board.
Id.
102. See Schwartz, supra note 4.
103. Press Release, Department of Commerce, Commerce Announces Streamlined
Encryption Export Regulations (Jan. 12, 2000), available at http://204.193.246.62/
public.nsf/docs/60D6B47456BB389F852568640078B6C0.
104. See id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Press Release, EPIC, ACLU, EFF, Civil Liberties Groups Say New Encryption
Export Regulations Still Have Serious Constitutional Deficiencies (Jan. 13, 2000), available
at http:llwww.epic.orglcrypto/exportcontrols/joint-release1l0.html.
109. Sanger & Clausing, supra note 2. Alan Davidson, an attorney for the CDT notes
that "[t]he good news is that consumers all over the world are going to have access to much
stronger encryption. The bad news is that if you want to send encryption out of the country,
you have to hire a lawyer to do it. These regulations are very complicated." Id.
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resources, the young entrepreneur or small business is not similarly
situated, and, thus, stands at a disadvantage.1 Because individuals who
have grown up in the information age have unique perspectives and
abilities, any economically restrictive policy hampers the success and
motivation of those with limited resources, and thus advancement in
general."' Third, licenses were still required if foreign governments
purchased products 12 Reinsch stated that this could apply to foreign
companies partially owned by governments-a significant restriction
because many foreign governments own telecommunication providers and
other companies."' Finally, the Center for Democracy and Technology
("CDT") argued that the regulations did not address First Amendment
concerns by failing to "exempt researchers from sharing their codes with
foreign counterparts ... [therefore causing] researchers ... to ask for
permission before they exchange ideas with people outside of the United
States. 11 4 The CDT argued that forcing researchers to seek permission
from the government before exchanging ideas with foreign researchers
functions as a prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment. The Sixth
Circuit recently addressed the issue and found that the First Amendment
protects computer source code, but it remanded the case to resolve whether
national security interests outweigh the interests in the open exchange of
encryption code. 5
110. Schwartz, supra note 4.
111. Also noteworthy is that small businesses likely will be adversely affected by not
using encryption for consumer protection as their larger counterparts may. Although a
significant number of small businesses do use the Internet (28% of companies with less than
20 employees, 54% of companies with between 20 and 99 employees, and 62% of
companies with between 199 and 499 employees), their interactions usually amount to
nothing more than online brochures. ToWARDs DIGITAL EQUALITY, supra note 19, at 25. The
reasons for this are many, but lack of knowledge about high technology, such as encryption,
is significant. Id. at 26. This will not only make small businesses less competitive, but it
soon may make them obsolete as e-commerce develops. Therefore, the technical new
regulations may stand as an additional barrier to true growth and utilization by small
private-sector businesses.
112. Sanger & Clausing, supra note 2.
113. Id.
114. Id. These comments were offered by Alan Davidson, an attorney for the CDT. ML
The intersection of First Amendment issues and the encryption debate are outside the scope
of this Note, but have received increasing attention over the last few years, especially in
regard to recent court cases including Bernstein v. United States Dept. of State. 974 F. Supp.
1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997). Bernstein, a mathematician, argued that the government's restriction
on his ability to publish encryption research on the Web operated as a prior restraint, was
vague and overbroad, and impinged on his right to freedom of association. Mack, supra note
40, at 990. The court found that encryption could qualify as speech protected under the First
Amendment. Id. For more information with regard to Bernstein, see http://www.eff.org
bernstein/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2001).
115. Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 482(6th Cir. 2000).
Number 2]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
Some concerns about the January 2000 announcement were answered
by the July 2000 statement doing away with the license requirement for the
EU and other specified countries. 1 Despite this attempted clarification,
fear of governmental access to encrypted information is still relevant,
especially in light of CESA and future legislation that may develop.
B. CESA: Implications and Probability of Passage
Along with the proposed liberalization of export regulations
announced in September 1999, the Clinton Administration also submitted
CESA for transmittal to Congress. CESA was drafted "[tlo protect the
privacy, security and safety of the people of the United States through
support for the widespread use of encryption, protection of the security of
cryptographic keys, and facilitation of access to the plaintext of data for
legitimate law enforcement purposes."
' 17
Through CESA, the government renewed its support for key escrow
and governmental access to decryption keys, the policy heavily criticized
when embodied in the Clipper Chip."8 The privacy concerns raised by
activist groups to the three Clipper proposals still bear relevance to CESA,
but they have been overshadowed to a certain extent by jubilant industry
reaction to the loosened export regulations. Congress took no action on
CESA during Clinton's final term in office, and, indeed, the chances of
CESA ever being introduced in Congress are minimal." 9 Recent history,
however, suggests that failed executive action on key escrow does not
mean the end of the policy's political life. Further, because the impetus
behind key escrow arises from national security concerns, the tension will
certainly survive into the Bush Administration. Therefore, even if CESA
itself never reaches Capitol Hill, careful attention should be paid to prepare
for critical analysis of future legislation raising similar concerns.
116. BXA, U.S. Updates Encryption Export Rules to European Union and Other Trading
Partners (Oct. 18, 2000), available at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/press/20O0/EncryptionRules
UpdatedOct2K.html.
117. The White House, The Cyberspace Electronic Security Act of 1999 (Sept. 16, 1999),
available at http://www.epic.org/crypto/legislation/cesa/bill-text.html.
118. See infra Part llI.B.
119. A staff member at the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications offered a
succinct opinion on CESA: "I don't see the bill going anywhere." Telephone interview by
the Author (Feb. 3, 2000). The staff member noted that if CESA were ever introduced in the
House or Senate, it would have to be "by request," because no member of the House or
Senate would want his or her name attached to the bill in its current form. Id.
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1. Three Bundles of Issues: The Main Provisions of the CESA
The provisions of CESA are all too familiar. Reminiscent of Clipper,
CESA was another attempt by the government, through law enforcement,
to gain access to decryption keys held in key escrow.120 Commentators
contend that CESA responds to the perceived major obstacle to acceptance
of key escrow-government agencies serving as TTPs.121 Currently, no
federal statutory protection exists for the privacy of decryption keys
already held by TTPs or CAs, and CESA responds to security concerns by
addressing "both the legitimate and unlawful uses of cryptography, [and
by] building a legal infrastructure for these emerging issues. 122 In
announcing CESA, the White House reassured the public that the bill does
not regulate domestic development of encryption and "Americans will
remain free to use any encryption system" they desire.'23
CESA effectively may be divided into three bundles of issues, though
this Note will address only one in detail. First, the proposal authorizes
funding of $80 million over four years for the creation of the FBI's
Technical Support Center to serve as the central resource for law
enforcement at all levels to respond to the growing use of encryption by
criminals and terrorists.124 Second, the proposal deals with law
enforcement's ability to gain access to decryption keys stored with third
parties, and creates some privacy protection for decryption keys held by
TTPs or CAs.12 Finally, CESA addresses concerns that law enforcement
investigations could potentially uncover trade secrets leading to litigation
and liability.
121
If CESA is enacted-again, an unlikely proposition-its $80 million
appropriation over four years to fund the proposed FBI support center does
not raise much concern. 127 This figure is not outrageous considering the
highly technical nature of encryption and the cost of the equipment needed
for research in this area. In fact, with the rise in computer crime, certainly
more funds need to be earmarked for law enforcement agencies to be able
to protect the public. As such, the monetary appropriation does not
120. See supra Part I-I.B.
121. See Key Escrow, supra note 76, at *1.
122. The White House, Analysis: The Cyberspace Electronic Security Act of 1999 (Sept.
13, 1999), at http://www.epic.org/crypto/legislation/cesalanalysis.htm.
123. The White House, Fact Sheet: The Cyberspace Electronic Security Act of 1999.
(CESA), 1999 WL 721386 (White House) (emphasis added).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See The Cyberspace Electronic Security Act of 1999, supra note 117, § 207.
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engender debate and, therefore, receives no further discussion in this
Note. 128
Regarding the second bundle of issues addressed by CESA, section
2711 pertains to "[d]isclosure or use of stored recovery information and
customer information by recovery agents; notification of storage
location,"' 29 stating that a recovery agent "shall not disclose stored recovery
information; use stored material to decrypt data or communications; or
disclose any other information or record that identifies a person or entity
for whom the recovery agent holds or has held stored recovery
information" unless the third party has permission or a court order.
30
Violators of this section would be subject to fines or imprisonment of up to
one year.' 3' This section addresses the safety concerns associated with
storing decryption keys with TTPs; despite protections offered in the
provision, however, it allows law enforcement to gain access to decryption
keys-and hence plaintext-without disclosure to the subject of the
investigation for ninety days or longer.
132
Section 2712 further explains how and when a governmental agency
may compel disclosure of decryption keys. Disclosure may be compelled
by a warrant, any process to compel disclosure under federal or state law, a
court order as detailed in section 2712 (b), or an investigative or law
enforcement officer's reasonable determination that an emergency situation
exists. 133 Subpart (a) also allows the federal government to require the use
of stored information for the benefit of a foreign government, which raises
serious concerns about how foreign governments could exploit this
provision. 3 4 A court would issue an order for disclosure upon a finding,
using specific facts, that the use of the recovery keys is "reasonably
necessary" to access the information, that the access is otherwise lawful,
that the government will access the information within a reasonable time
after getting the keys, and that there is no privacy interest in decrypted
information.
135
The question whether an entity retains a privacy interest in decryption
keys stored with a third party raises serious concerns. The Justice
Department has suggested that any time decryption keys are stored with a
third party, the storer no longer has a privacy interest in any information
128. The section pertaining to trade secrets also lies outside the scope of this Note.
129. The Cyberspace Electronic Security Act of 1999, supra note 117, § 2711.
130. Id. §§ 2711(a)(1)(A)-(B), (b)(1)(A)(ii).
131. Id. §2711(e).
132. Id. § 2711(b)(2)(d).
133. Id. § 2712(a)(1)-(4).
134. Id. § 2712(a).
135. Id. § 2712(b)(1)-(4).
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encrypted with the recoverable key. 36 Additionally, while section 2712(c)
forces the government to notify the person whose decryption keys have
been accessed within ninety days after decrypting the information, this time
frame may be extended indefinitely on an ex parte showing of good
cause-again, an ambiguous standard. 137 Unlike the contemporaneous
notice the subject of an investigation receives when law enforcement
searches a house or office, it is possible an individual would never realize
the government was decrypting and reading confidential communications.
2. Criticisms of CESA
The CDT, an online privacy group that monitors encryption policy on
its Web site, offered its own analysis of CESA when it was released. The
group highlighted deficiencies in the proposed legislation and expressed
concerns that the relaxation of export regulations may have been an
anticipatory quid pro quo for industry acceptance of key escrow.1 38 A
policy analyst at the CDT, Lusan Chan, speculated that, because the
government finally realized that export restrictions were not a viable
option, it had to shift gears to ensure governmental access, "[n]ow that they
realize... [key escrow in] the marketplace has become outdated, they are
focusing on law enforcement access. We are concerned they are using this
concession as a way to expand current law enforcement activity."'139 Indeed,
after the January and July liberalization, the Clinton Administration might
have felt, or expected, that industry and privacy groups would be more
willing to accept CESA or similar legislation. The CDT also criticized the
proposal for permitting foreign governments to gain access to recovery
keys, as well as for allowing any federal law enforcement officer to
demand a decryption key from a TIP or CA when the officer determines
140that an emergency exists-thereby cutting out the judicial intermediary.
The largest concern raised by CESA, however, is its potential Fourth
Amendment deficiencies. CESA only requires that law enforcement prove
it is "reasonably necessary" to gain access to decryption keys, as opposed
to meeting the more stringent "probable cause" requirement of the Fourth
136. CDT, Initial CDTAnalysis of Clinton Administration's Proposed Cyberspace
Electronic Security Act (CESA): Standards for Government Access to Decryption Keys
(Sept. 23, 1999), at http://www.cdt.org/crypto/ CESA/cdtcesaanalysis.shtml.
137. The Cyberspace Electronic Security Act of 1999, supra note 117, § 2112(c).
138. See Ann Harrison, Clinton Eases Crypto Export Ban, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 20,
1999, available at LEXIS-NEXIS.
139. Id.
140. CDT, Initial CDT Analysis of the Clinton Administration's Proposed Cyberspace
Electronic Security Act (CESA): Standards for Government Access to Decryption Keys
(Sept. 23, 1999), at http://www.cdt.orgtcrypto/CESA/cdtcesaanalysis.shtml.
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Amendment. 4' Additionally, the Fourth Amendment requires the
government to obtain a search warrant for an original location, and if clues
from that search uncover information leading to a different location,
officers must return to court and obtain another warrant. 42 Such is not the
case when encrypted information is involved. For example, under CESA, a
federal agent could gain access to decryption keys by "a finding of no
constitutional privacy interest in the plaintext," even though she does not
know what the plaintext will reveal. 43 Therefore, CESA allows seizure of
decryption keys from a TTP or CA as well as the seizure of plaintext
relating to the subject of the investigation-two searches for the price of
144
one.
While CESA does not require individuals or companies to store
decryption keys with third parties, 4' as the use of encryption increases,
more and more entities will store decryption keys with third parties, and
thus potentially sacrifice their privacy interest in the data revealed. In a
press briefing after the September proposal, Peter Swire, Chief Counsel for
Privacy at OMB, invoked conservative scare tactics encouraging key
escrow, stating, "Think of your bank ATM card. What would it be like if
you forgot your password and could not obtain access to the money in your
account[?] That is precisely what can happen with strong encryption. If you
lose the password, then all that encrypted material is scrambled forever and
lost.' ' 46 The fate of CESA is dim, especially as more constituents realize
the importance of the issue and the far-reaching implications of allowing
the government access to recovery keys. Nevertheless, public
consciousness of inroads into online privacy is essential, especially as a
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. Press Briefing by Administration Officials on Encryption, Sept. 16, 1999, available
at 1999 WL 722459 (White House). When speaking at the briefing, OMB Chief Counselor
for Privacy Peter Swire was quick to point out what CESA would not do:
CESA does not require anyone to use key escrow, nor does it regulate how key
escrow might develop in the private sector. The only effect of CESA on key
escrow is to provide privacy assurances for those who freely choose to give
their backups of key information to others. Some information stored outside of
your home deserves to be carefully protected.
Id. at *8.
The government may protest too much, however. It certainly could be that in a few
years, because of the amount of encryption required for effective e-commerce and secure
online business transactions, people may not realize the present implications of passing such
a law.
146. Id. at *7.
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new administration assumes power.
V. WHY THE SHIFT, AND WILL IT CONTINUE?.
Many have questioned why the Clinton Administration altered its
U.S. encryption policy so drastically from the original announcement of the
Clipper Chip in 1993. Various reasons are offered, the most obvious and
accurate being the recognition of global marketplace realities and the
inability of the United States to stem foreign creation of robust encryption.
Because anyone with a PC and an Internet connection can download strong
encryption products, the U.S. restriction on exportation of strong key-
length products had little effect on the dissemination of such products
globally. The old policy simply was unrealistic, which harmed the domestic
encryption industry through lost revenue and opportunity for expansion.
Other reasons for the shift include pressure from powerful industry
groups to loosen export restrictions. The Clinton Administration described
its approach to Internet policy as an area in which the private sector should
lead-a characterization undermined by unilateral government
regulation. 47 Indeed, Silicon Valley has been so irritated with
governmental regulation in this area that, even after the export regulations
were announced in January 2000, one Washington, D.C. attorney noted
that, "the Valley is only going to be satisfied when the director of the
[NSA] crawls across the Bay Bridge to apologize for controls."'148
Additionally, the dramatic change in policy was linked to Al Gore's
unsuccessful run for the 2000 presidency, with reports circulated that his
office was flooded by complaints about the previous restrictions, and hints
that if Gore wanted support from the high-tech industry, change had to
149
occur.
Progress has been made in the past two years, but the government
must be monitored and regulations governing the exportation of encryption
products should be further simplified. The complexity of the January 2000
regulations was simplified somewhat in July, but even after the
modification, the European Commission released trade barrier reports in
August, determining that the U.S. encryption regime still inhibited trade
and the growth of e-commerce#' ° Additionally, as the amount of
information stored online continues to grow exponentially, key escrow will
147. TowARDs DIGrrALEQUALrY, supra note 19, at iii.
148. Sanger & Clausing, supra note 2.
149. Id. Gore's supporters in Silicon Valley became angry over the restrictions placed on
export. IL
150. See EC Report Raises Concerns on U.S. Satellite Licensing, CoMM. DAILY, Aug. 2,
2000, at 6.
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be a requisite of living and working in the new millennium. A law passed
now forcing TTPs or CAs to release encryption keys to law enforcement
upon request will have more effect in the future than the present, as more
people will store encryption keys with a third party. Careful attention must
be focused on these issues.
VI. CONCLUSION
Every clich6 that has been bandied about in the past five years-the
information superhighway, the technological revolution, the information
age-is literally true, even if overused. Encryption technology stands at the
vanguard of further advancement in the areas of e-commerce, online
retailing, and the creation of a secure interconnected world. By leveling the
playing field with foreign competitors, the recent relaxation of encryption
regulations will certainly be a boon to the U.S. high-tech industry. Still, a
critical eye must remain on further U.S. encryption policy development,
especially as the Bush Administration begins to implement its agenda.
Privacy concerns based on information sent over the Internet are real and
growing. Future legislation similar to CESA must be evaluated for any
Fourth Amendment deficiencies. Such evaluation is necessary in the world
as it will be-a world where the most intimate information is not stored in
a safe, but in an encrypted file on a network accessible to anyone with the
right key.
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